In two completely separate incidents and cases, individuals, identified only as ABJ and BDN allegedly made statements in support of a proscriber organisation, to whit, HAMAS.

HAMAS is a designated terrorist organisation in the UK and many other countries. HAMAS has both political and armed wings but the designation does not differentiate. However, the designation does not apply to support for Palestinians in their defence against Isreali occupation and aggression. This is a distinction that Israel's supporters work to dimish and many supporters of the Palestinian people do not understand and/or make.

In the instant case, the trials of the two appellants were heard at different times in different courts but both included a finding that it is not a defence to claim ignorance that HAMAS is a designated and prosecribed organisation.

The appeals on this narrow and specific point were heard together.

Counsel for the appellants put forward he following arguments:
1. That the judges ought to have concluded that the prosecution was required to prove awareness of the fact of proscription;
2. that the judges failed to properly direct the jury in relation to the proportionality tests required under Article 10 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Article 10) (ECHR).

The arguments are technical and of themselves not very interesting. But the result is important:

In English criminal law, one of the most basic principles of that ignorance of the law is no defence. To simply say "I didn't know it was a crime" is not enough. That, by a somewhat roundabout route, also means that recklessness would undermine any argument there may be relating to the consequences of the offence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, albeit on a much more technical analysis than that.

The case has very wide implications and is set in a historical context that many will not know.

In the 1980s, in the UK, a widespread terrorism campaign spread from Northern Ireland to Mainland Britain. One of the tools used to restrict its spread was the ban on doing or saying anything that might promote or support the designated terrorist groups. In simpler media times, there was in effect a media blackout with Margaret Thatcher, then Prime Minister, said was designed to "starve them of the oxygen of publicity."

Fast forward to today's connected world; the first thing is that mass publication tools are literaly in the hands of millions of people who do not know the laws of publishing and in many cases do not even realise they are publishing when they post to social media or to chat groups.

But they do know they are distributing messages of support and in that it is no different to standing on a soap box inciting others to join a cause.

So the decision is as expected. The importance is that it emphasises that everyone who publishes or otherwise expresses an opinion must be aware of the legality of that expression and the consequences that may flow.

Also, it doesn't matter how the expression is made: broadcast, publication, social media, chat group or in person : the offence is the same and the consequences will flow.

It is here that the question of proportionality may become relevant, not in relation to guilt but in relation to sentencing. Social media post seen by thousands of people in an hour is very different to a comment made in the street, both in terms of initial reach and amplification.

Full judgment: https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/ABJ-v-Rex-and-BDN-v…