And China has been using it, to great effect, in relation to the infamous "scam compounds" across South East Asia and in Africa. The result has been general applause.

However, the article says that it could be used for far more than such suspected criminals and could be used to arrest and, in what looks suspiciously like the USA's "rendition" scheme, forcibly repatriate, or remove to China, anyone who speaks out against what Chinese officials consider to be Chinese interests.

The article says that some countries have co-operated, implying that the scheme works by bypassing formal extradition processes and even where there is no extradition agreement.

Some countries, reportedly, have refused.

So, why does this interest me from a financial crime risk strategists' perspective?

Some months ago, China announced that foreign persons would not be permitted to undertake due diligence in China. Despite illegality, there are still people who are doing it, both within China and from the outside looking in.

Many of those have based themselves in, for example, Singapore, Bangkok and Manila. But, Singapore has shown itself more than willing to send suspected criminals back to China. Despite the turf (to be more precise surf) wars with the Philippines, the government has allowed Chinese police to act against syndicates running illegal operations and in Thailand, Chinese police have been allowed free passage to raid "scam compounds" across the border in Myanmar - action which the Myanmar authorities have, basically, given retrospective approval for.

But none of those countries have a significant amount of Chinese money for investment. It is the money that is causing concern because some countries, increasingly dependent on Chinese investment, may find it difficult to say "no".

Let's be clear, I am not a subscriber to the anti-China claims that it is holding developing countries to ransom with toxic loans, designed to push those countries into impossible to meet debt. That is, quite simply, rhetoric for political purposes by people who have a particular agenda - mainly that aid should be a grant not a loan and that so-called debt-forgiveness should be business as usual. All China has done is to make loans, on commercial terms, for infrastructure projects, at the request of governments, which have defaulted.

But having said that, it is easy to see how, anxious not to displease a lender which is already being patient, a government might feel it imprudent, or merely embarrassing, to refuse a request, so turning a kidnapping into a semi-authorised arrest.

So the central problem here is not the fact of the power - everyone wants those operating "scam compounds" to be taken off the board and if their own government is prepared to put in the resources to make that happen, there is general cheering, not worries.

The problem is the extent of the laws - there's a world of difference between those who deliberately try to undermine a state - across South East Asia, almost all governments (I say "almost" but I think it's all) have laws against sedition and the like. It becomes a concern when any and all criticism is classed as sedition and the police are required to investigate anyone who is reported as questioning the government or, even, as happened recently in Malaysia recently, poke fun at a state leader, not even the national government, in a comedy show.

China, in Hong Kong, has shown that it is extraordinarily sensitive to criticism, changing the law and compelling prosecutions of those who have spoken out against China's governance of Hong Kong. But even there, China has a point. The battle for universal suffrage in Hong Kong was lost in the late 1980s, at least a decade before Hong Kong became a special administrative zone.

So, should we worry about the law? Yes, we should, but we should also recognise that it is a far more complex issue than "China's snatch squads" which is how, I have no doubt, is what some who read the Taipei Times article will conclude it means.